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lN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN rrHE MATTER OF:
THE ESTATE OF THOMAS
FAIRCLOUGH PIERPONT,
Deceased,
TRACY-COLLINS TRUST
COMPANY and
VILATE P. DEVINE,
Appellants,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9022

MARGUERITE GESSFORD
PIERPONT and
ELLA P. MEYER,
Respondents.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
I. THE TIME OF VESTING OF THE RESIDUAL
ESTATE IN THE TRUSTEE AND THE EFFECTIVE
DATE OF THE TRUST PROVISIONS ARE CONTROLLED BY THE TESTATOR'S INTENTION, NOT
BY STATUTORY OR CASE AUTHORITY.

A basic issue involved here is the time when title to
the trust property vested in Tracy-Collins Trust Company as Trustee and the time when the trust provisions
of the will became effective.
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Appellants ur~e that this question must be answered
from an interpretation of the will and that under the
will provisions analyzed at pages 13-18 of Appellants'
Brief, the residual estate vested in the Trustee, both in
title and possession, on distribution from the Executor
and the trust provisions became effective only then.
01). the other hand, Respondents argue that the
answer lies in an application of §74-2-25, U. C. A. 1953
and certain cited case authorities which, they assert,
caused title to the residual estate to vest in the Trustee
at the Testator's death. The essential difference in these
contentions is shown by the following quotation from
page 9 of Respondent Meyer's Brief:
''Counsel * * * argues in brief the intention of
the testator. We will stick with the law and show
that the cases throughout the land are against
Appellants' position and will confirm this court
in affirming the lower court.''
The leading case cited by Respondents to support
their argument is In re Platt's Estate (California), 21
Cal. 2d 323, 121 P. 2d 825. Of the Platt case Respondent,
Pierpont, states at page 14 of her brief:

"In re Platt's Estate cited supra deals with
nearly all of the problems concerned in this Pierpont will and appeal and this case follows the
rule of the Restatement §234 Trusts also cited
above. Platt holds that the trust yests at the
testator's death."
Respondent, Meyer, quotes at length from this case at
pages 12 to 14 of her brief and at page 11 states:
''So here we have the whole case in a nutshell,
decided in the highest court in California, over-
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ruling an erroneous line of prior authority, with
a rationale that must be followed here because
our statutes are the same, and the logic is identical • * *" (Emphasis added)
In fact, the California and Utah statutes governing
the time of vesting of Testator's estates are very dissimilar. Because of this difference, the Pla.tt case and
other similar California cases are not controlling or even
persuasive here, except as an application of their reasoning leads to the result contended for by Appellants.
Section 28 of the California Probate Code is identical
with §74-2-25, U. C. A. 1953, and provides that testamentary dispositions are presumed to vest at the Testator's death. However, this presumption can be overcome by the Testator's expressed intention that title
vests at a later time. (See In re Lowe's Estate, 68
Utah 49, 249 Pac. 128 where this court held, in interpreting §6371, Compiled Laws 1917, which is identical with
said §74-2-25, U. C. A. 1953, that title to the decedent's
estate vested at death under the will involved there
because there was "nothing in the will to indicate an
intention on the part of the testatrix that the vesting
of the bequests and devises made therein should be
postponed beyond her death.'')
However, in California there is an additional statutory provision governing the vesting of decedents estates
not found in the Utah Code which accounts for the unqualified statement in the Platt and other similar cases
that testamentary dispositions vest at the testator's
death. Section 300 of the California Probate Code provides:
3
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"When a person dies, the title to his property,
real and personal, passes to the person to whom
it is devised or bequeathed by his last will, or, in
the absence of such disposition, to the persons
who succeed to his estate as provided in division
II of this code ; but all of his property shall be
subject to the possession of the executor or administrator and to the control of the superior
court for the purposes of administration, sale or
other disposition under the provisions of division
III of this code, and shall be chargeable with the
expenses of administering his estate, and the
payment of his debts and the allowances to the
family, except as otherwise provided in this code.
Thus, under the California statutes, title to a testator's
property vests in the will beneficiaries at the testator's death despite the provisions of the will.
Starting from the premise that the residual estate
vested in the trustee at the testator's death subject to
the executor's possession and control during probate, the
court in the Platt case concluded that payments from the
trust accrued from that date. It said:
"Unquestionably the rule of the restatement is
based upon sound reasoning. As title to all testamentary dispositions vests at the testator's death
* * * the title of the trustee to Mr. Platt's property vested as of that date even though the trust
estate v;as residuary in character.''
In In re Hyland's Esta.te, 58 Cal. App. 2d 556, 137
P. :2d 273, 275, the California court commented as follows on the Platt case:
''The opinion of the Supreme Court points out
that under tl1e la-w of this state the title under a
testamentary disposition vests as of the date of
4
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death of the testator, that as a result the trustee's
title and that of the beneficiary vest as of that
date, and concludes that the life tenant is therefore entitled to income from that date as an incident of that title." (Emphasis added.)
Under this reasoning a delay in the vesting of title
would inevitably lead to a corresponding delay in the
commencement of payments from a trust created by will.
The lower court in this case said in its minute entry
of September 24, 1958 :
''An examination of the cases and the restatement of the Law of Trusts appears to support
the view expressed in the prior ruling of the
Court." (R. p. 463.)
It is evident that both the lower court and Respondents are ignorant of the important difference in the
California and Utah statutes and have erroneously
assumed that title to the trust estate vested in the Trustee
at the Testator's death, notwithstanding the express provisions of the will to the contrary. Likewise, they have
failed to comprehend that the reasoning supporting the
California cases and the rule of the Restatement was
based upon this assumed vesting of title in the trustee
at testator's death and that if, in fact, title vested in
the trustee at a later time, the commencement of payments from the trust logically would be deferred until
then. Thus, an application of the reasoning of the California cases and the Restatement here necessarily lead
to the result contended for by Appellants, since the Pierpont will clearly provides that title to the residual estate
would vest in the Trustee at the time of distribution.
5
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In re Dare's Estate, 196 Cal. 29, 35 ; 235 Pac. 725;
In re Hyland's Estate, 58 Cal. A.pp. 2d 556; 137 P. 2d
73, 75; In re Schiffman's Estate, 86 Cal. App. 2d 638;
195 P. 2d 484, 488; and In re Hill's Estate, 149 Cal. App.
2d 779; 309 P. 2d 39, cited by Respondent, Pierpont, at
pages 13 and 14 of her brief are inapplicable here because they either cited and followed the Platt case or
involved will provisions essentially the same as those in
the Platt case.
Lightenberg v. Burdell, 101 Cal. App. 20, 281 Pac.
518 and Western Pacific Railway v. Godfrey, 36 Pac. 284,
cited by Respondent, Meyer, at page 19 of her brief,
correctly state the California rule that the estate of a
decedent vests in his devisees and legatees immediately
upon his death but, of course, have no applicability in
Utah.
Eldredge v. Eldredge, 9 Cushing (Mass.) 516; In re
Gaffer's Estate, 5 N.Y. S~ 2d 671; Parkhurst v. Gi'YIIn, 117
N. E. 202 (Mass.); In re Will of S.C. Leitsch, 201 N. W.
284 (Wis.), 37 A. L. R. 547; State Ba;nk of Chicago v.
Gross, 344 Ill. 512; 176 N. E. 739; 75 A. L. R. 172;
Caughy v. State Deposit & Trust Co., 196 l\Id. 252; 76 A.
2d 323, cited in one or the other of Respondents' briefs,
are not controlling, or eYen persuasive here. The will
provisions involved in those cases are far different from
the will provisions in question here. Almost without exception, those cases make the statement that the first
duty of the court was to ascertain and give effect to the
intention expressed in the testator's will. Similarly,
interpretation of the Pierpont ·will is the chief duty of
the eourt here.
6
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II. IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN TESTATOR'S
DEATH AND FINAL DISTRIBUTION, TITLE TO
THE RESIDUAL ESTATE WAS VESTED IN
TRACY-COLLINS TRUST COMPANY AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE.
As Respondent, Meyer, correctly points out at page
20 of her brief, at common-law title to personal property
of a testator vested in the executor upon its appointment. Some jurisdictions, like California, altered this
common-law rule to provide that at death both real and
personal property descend directly to the beneficiary
with a qualified right of possession in the personal representative for the purpose of administering the estate.
In such jurisdictions the executor functions in a manner
similar to a receiver in that possession but not title is
in the executor and it lacks the power of disposal except
by court order.
However, Utah has not wholly abolished this common-law rule. Our statute only raises the presumption
that title to a testator's personal property descends directly to the beneficiaries which, of course, is controlled
by the testator's intention.
Since the Pierpont will expressly provides that the
residual estate would vest in the Trustee only after the
estate had been probated and since the residual estate
consisted wholly of personal property, title to that property vested in Tracy-Collins Trust Company as executor
of the estate at Mr. Pierpont's death, where it remained
vested until distributed to the bank as Trustee.

III. THE RIGHTS AND POWERS OF TRACY-COLLINS
TRUST COMPANY AS EXECUTOR OF THE PIER-

7
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PONT WILL ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT
FROM THE RIGHTS AND POWERS IT HAS AS
TRUSTEE.

It is elementary and unquestioned law that one
person can simultaneously act in several legal capacities
and that the holding or exercise of rights and powers in
one legal capacity does not constitute the holding or
exercise of rights and powers in another simultaneously
occupied legal capacity. So the rights and powers of
Tracy-Collins Trust Company in its capacity as Executor
are distinct from its rights and powers as Trustee.
Despite this, Respondent, Pierpont, makes the unfounded statement at page 12 of her brief that in Utah
the "fiction of the separation between executor and
trustee as to their powers and duties'' had been abolished,
citing In re Lowe's Estate, 68 Utah 49, 249 Pac. 128, as
authority. Counsel either did not fully read this decision
or read it and did not understand what it held. The case
did not involve a question of the exercise of any rights
or powers by the executor or the trustee. Rather, it
involved the question of ·whether a trust beneficiary
could, during probate of the estate, exercise a power
granted by the will to designate a substitute trustee.
':rhe will provided that upon the exercise of that power
the trustee designated in the will would be required "to
transfer and conYey all of such property at the time in
its hands and possession to such other trust company."
The appellant trust company contended that this language implied that the beneficiary could not exercise the
power until the trust estate "Tas distributed to the trust
8
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company as trustee. In rejecting this contention, the
Supreme Court stated:
''Such language merely shows, in our judgment,
that it was her intention that whenever Mrs.
Hampton in writing designated another trust
company to act as trustee in place of the Bankers'
Trust Company, then the latter should transfer
and convey the title to and deliver possession, if
it then had possession, of the trust estate to its
successor in trust.''
The court then went on to point out that the title to the
trust estate vested in the trusee at the moment of the
testatrix's death and that the reason for this holding
was that there was nothing in the will to overcome the
statutory presumption that title vested in the trustee at
the testatrix's death. Observe the language of the court
which followed a reference to the statute which created
a presumption that title vested at the testatrix's death:
"There is nothing in the will to indicate an intention on the part of the testatrix that the vesting
of the bequest and devises made therein should
be postponed beyond her death.'' (Emphasis
added.)
At page 10 of her brief Respondent, Meyer, states
in reference to In re Lowe's Esta.te, that reversal here
can be made on no grounds other than a reversal of
that decision. This statement is incorrect and ignores
the fact that in will interpretation cases the results, which
are dependent on the testator's intent, vary as will provisions vary. A reversal here would, therefore, be entirely consistent with In re Lowe's Estate if based upon
the proper ground that the will provisions overcame the
9
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statutory presumption. In fact, because of the explicit
language providing for the vesting in the trustee of
title to the residual estate at the time of distribution, an
affirmance here would constitute a reversal of the principle upheld in Lowe's Estate that a testator's expressed
intention will overcome the presumption and control.
IV. MR. PIERPONT'S INTENTION CANNOT BE
ASCERTAINED FROM WHAT SOME OTHER TESTATOR PROVIDED.
The pertinent provisions of the testator's will in In
re Sears' Estate, 18 Utah 193, 55 Pac. 83 (cited by Respondent, Pierpont, at page 19 of her brief and by Respondent, Meyer, at pages 32, 36 and 44 of her brief)
provided as follows :
" 'First, I give, bequeath, and devise to my
executors, hereinafter named, all the property,
both real and personal, of which I may die possessed, after the payment of my debts and the
expenses of administration, in trust for the following purposes : (1) To pay to my wife, Melissa
Sears, during her life, such sums of money as my
said trustees may, in their sound judgment and
discretion, think reasonable and sufficient for her
maintenance, having regard for her position and
station in life; said sums to be paid monthly, beginning at the date of my decease. ( 2) To pay
to my sister, Maria Liddle, during her life, for
the support of herself and her children living
with her, the sum of fifty dollars each month,
beginning with the date of my decease. (3) To
pay to my nurse, :Mary .lL .Anderson, the sum of
two hundred and fifty dollars, as soon as there
shall be sufficient moneys in their hands; said two
hundred and fifty dollars being intended by me as
a gift to her for her faithful services during my
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late sickness and in addition to compensation for
such services. ' ' '
After the payment of debts, expenses of administration
and a monthly allowance to the widow during probate,
which lasted about a year, only $617.87 remained in the
estate. The issue was whether the sister, Maria Liddle,
was entitlBd to payments under subparagraph (2),
quoted above, in preference to payments provided for
the nurse, Mary A. Anderson, under subparagraph (3).
The trial court held that the nurse was entitled to payment in preference to the sister. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the bequest to the sister was an
annuity which commenced at the testator's death and
was preferred over the bequest to the nurse.
The Sears case did not involve a question as to the
payments provided to be made to the wife and the statements made by Respondent, Pierpont, at page 19 of her
brief are erroneous.
Because of the language of the will, the Sears' Estate
decision was correct in holding that an annuity was
created for the sister. First, the amount of the payments
was definite ($50.00 per month) and the duty to make
them was unqualified and unconditional. Also, the will
expressly provided that the payments were to commence
at the testator's death. These provisions removed any
question about the testator having provided for a time
of commencement of payment other than the date of
death.

It is apparent that the will involved in Sears' Estate
is not even remotely similar to the pertinent provisions
11
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of the Pierpont will. Had the testator in Sears' Estate
made the payments to the sister conditional and failed
to provide that the payments were to commence at his
death, as is true here, the holding would have been different.
Obviously, In re Sears' Estate has no applicability
and the citation of it by Respondents points to the
futility of attempting to decide the meaning of the provisions of one testator's will on the basis of what some
other testator provided . .._t\..s was stated in In re Luckel's
Estate cited by Respondent, Pierpont, at pages 14 and
21 of her brief:
''A will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this
intention must be given effect if possible. Each
case depends on its own particular facts and
precedents are of small value.''
V. RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO INTERPRET
THE vVILL AS A WHOLE.
Although this appeal involves a question of will
interpretation, neither of the Respondents has seriously
attempted to analyze and interpret the various provisions of Mr. Pierpont's will. Their briefs devote much
space to cases interpreting the intention of other testators but little to interpreting \Yhat :Mr. Pierpont intended.
In the instances when Respondents do make reference to
the Pierpont will, it is usually to an isolated clause or
sentence taken out of context and usually is made without
comment as to what preceded or followed it. In effect,
it seems that when Respondents do look at the will, it is
done with blinders so as to exclude from view anything
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inconsistent with the narrow segment being read. The ·
following references to the Respondents' briefs demonstrate this :

1. In the last few lines of page 6 of her brief, Respondent, Pierpont, states :
"It is significant that paragraph 7 (i) instructs
that the trustee shall make disbursements 'from
the income of the trust estate and if insufficient.
from the principal thereof' indicating the full
extent to which the testator was willing to go to
see that these monthly payments would be made.''

The brief neglects to mention that the above quoted
provision is qualified by the language "subject to the
provisions of subparagraph (k) of this paragraph
SEVENTH.''

2. At the top of page 7 of Pierpont's brief it 1s
stated in reference to subparagraph SEVENTH (k):
"It provides that if income is insufficient and
principal funds are not available that the trustee
'may' reduce and if necessary 'may suspend' further payments until funds become available
through income or orderly sale of all or part of
the principal assets, but in the event any payments specified to be made by trustee shall be so
reduced or suspended, when funds become available, any so resulting deficiencies shall be made
up.''
The brief fails to point out that the words "it is my
desire" precede the provision "that when funds become
available, any so resulting deficiencies in monthly payments shall be made up.''
3. Also at page 7 of her brief, Respondent, Pier-

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pont, refers to the words ''To make the payments specified hereunder'' as indicating the payments provided for
under subparagraph SEVENTH (i) were absolute and
unconditional. This, however, ignores the fact that the
payments which are ''specified'' or described there are
expressly made subject to all the provisions of subparagraph SEVENTH (k). The respondent would like to
interpret ''specified'' in its mandatory rather than its
descriptive sense. However, when the word is examined
in context, it is apparent that it cannot be so interpreted.
4. At the top of page 20 of her brief Respondent,
Pierpont, in referring to the provisions of subparagraph
SEVENTH (k) regarding the making up of reduced or
suspended payments, quotes the words ''shall be made
up'' out of context without mentioning the qualifying,
precatory language "It is my desire" contained in the
same sentence.
5. In paragraph 1 page 8 of her brief Respondent,
Meyer, similarly fails to note the qualifying precatory
language "it is my desire" and sees only the words
"shall be made up." It is significant that in In re Pittack's Will cited at page 33 of Appellants' brief, the
provision interpreted by the court as not imposing a
mandatory duty on the trustee was :
"and it is my desire and I request that C. A.
Morden shall be elected 'manager of the Oregonian
and shall be retained as such, and that Edgar B.
Piper shall be retained as managing editor of the
Oregonian until he shall become incapacitated or
until he may voluntarily resign.''
Consistent with established principles of will construe-
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tion, the precatory language was there held to confer
discretion on the trustee, notwithstanding the repeated
use of the word ''shall''.
6. At the top of page 18 Respondent, Meyer, quotes
the following portion of subparagraph (k) "any so resulting deficiencies in monthly payments shall be made
up" and ignores the qualifying precatory language "It
is my desire. ''
7. Again at page 35 of her brief Respondent, Meyer,
looks only at the words "shall be made up."
8. At pages 37 and 39 Respondent, Meyer, argues
that the words "payments required to be made" in line
2 of subparagraph SEVENTH (k) are to be interpreted
as making the SEVENTH (i) payments absolute and
unconditional. Again Respondent prefers to ignore the
other provisions of the paragraph in the light of which
the quoted words must be read. In addition Respondent
loses sight of the fact that the word ''require'' has two
meanings: one mandatory "to ask for authoritatively or
imperatively, or as a right; to demand, claim, insist on
having"; the other definition "to call for or demand as
appropriate or suitable in the particular case; to need
for some end or purpose.'' (Oxford Universal Dictionary
1955 p. 1711) The "required" payments referred to in
subparagraph SEVENTH (k) are, of course, the SEVENTH (i) payments which are expressly made subject
to all of the provisions of subparagraph SEVENTH (k).
It is apparent that under these circumstances the word
"required" was used in the sense of the second above
mentioned definition. If the interpretation argued for
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by Respondent, Meyer, were adopted it would necessarily
follow that the SEVENTH (i) payments could be neither
reduced or suspended as provided in SEVENTH (k),
nor, in fact, could any of the provisions of SEVENTH
(k) operate to limit or qualify the absolute requirement
to pay the monthly sums. It would be difficult to think
of a better example than this one to demonstrate the
absurdity of attempting to interpret testamentary intention from an isolated phrase, wrested out of context.
The evident reason for Respondents' failure to interpret the will as a whole is that to do so leads to a result
contrary to the one they have asserted on appeal.

VI. THE PHRASE "DURING HER LIFETIME" USED
IN PARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) (1) and (2) HAS
NO BEARING ON THE QUESTION OF WHEN THE
PAYMENTS TO RESPONDENTS WERE TO COMMENCE.
Both Respondents argue that the phrase "during
her lifetime'' used in Paragraph SEVENTH (i) (1)
and (2) express an intention that the respective payments were to commence at the Testator's death rather
than at the time of distribution. No attempt is made in
either answering brief to explain the reasoning processes
by which this conclusion was reached, nor is any supporting authority cited.
Their contention is not based upon a literal interpretation of the language, since literally, the words would
mean from the time of the Respondents' births until their
deaths. Neither Respondent, however, contends that
Paragraph SEVENTH (i) pa~~ments extend beyond the
t.i1ne of the Testator's death, "·hich can only mean, there-
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fore, that in their view the words have reference to a
period commencing at some point in time after they were
born and continuing thereafter during the remainder of
their lives. They have arbitrarily, without reason or
explanation, established that starting point as the date
of the Testator's death. In answer, Appellants could,
with equal arbitrariness and lack of reason, say that the
starting point was the time of the distribution of the
residual estate to the trustee. Neither argument standing alone has any force, however, and adds nothing to
the attempt to get at the meaning of the Testator's will.
It is obvious, therefore, that the words "during her lifetime" viewed alone have no bearing on the time when
the payments to Respondents were to commence.
VII. SECTION 74-3-12 U. C. A. 1953 IS INAPPLICABLE
HERE.

Section 74-3-12 U. C. A. 1953 referred to by Respondent, Meyer, at pages 5 and 8 of her brief provides :
"In case of a bequest of the interest or income of a
certain sum or fund, the income accrues from the testator's death." This section is inapplicable here for two
reasons. First, a trust consisting of an uncertain residual
estate cannot be considered a ''certain'' sum or fund
within the meaning of said §74-3-12. Second, §74-3-12
is controlled by §74-3-16 which provides ''The four preceding sections are in all cases to be controlled by a
testator's express intention." Here the testator expressly provided that the residual estate would not vest
in the trustee, and the trust would not be created until
final distribution from the executor. There could be no
income from the trust until after it came into being.
17
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Furthermore, during probate the property of the estate
produced a total of only $244.75 in income (R. pp. 208213; 297-305). Therefore, any judgment in favor of
Respondents based upon §74-3-12 would have to be limited to that amount.
At page 8 of her brief Respondent, Meyer, argues,
in reference to said §74-3-12, that if income, which may
vary in amount, accrues from the Testator's death,
monthly payments, payable from income or principal,
clearly commence then. This argument is based upon the
false assumptions (1) that §74-3-12 is applicable to residual trusts uncertain in character, and (2) that the trust
came into being at Testator's death and the payments
from the trust commenced then. In addition, it erroneously assumes that the payments are absolute and unconditional and unvarying in amount. In other words,
that the payments are annuities. However, annuities are
controlled by §74-3-14 and not §74-3-12.
VIII. SECTION 74-3-14 U. C. A. 1953 IS INAPPLICABLE
HERE.
At pages 18 to 19 of her brief Respondent, Pierpont,
argues that even assuming the payments provided to be
made from subparagraph SEVENTH (i) are not annuities, they are general legacies which, under §74-3-14 U. C.
A. 1953 would be due and deliYerable one year after Testator's decease. This argument ignores the fact that under
§74-3-16 the Testator's intention controls §74-3-14, which
leads us once again to the basic inquiry as to when the
Testator intended that the residual estate would vest in
the Trustee and the time when the trust provisions of
the will would become effertiYe.
18
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IX. THE CHECKS REFERRED TO BY RESPONDENT,
MEYER, ARE NOT IN EVIDENCE AND REFERENCE TO THEM IS IMPROPER. EVEN IF ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE, THEY WOULD HAVE
NO BEARING ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED HERE.
At pages 25 to 28 of her brief Respondent, Meyer,
refers to certain checks from the Testator to Mrs. Meyer
which were offered in evidence at the hearing in the
lower court. The court refused to admit the checks in
evidence, ruling that no extrinsic evidence was admissible unless there was an ambiguity in the will. The
court found that the will was clear and unambiguous. In
answer to a question asked at the hearing, counsel for
Mrs. Meyer conceded that the will was unambiguous. No
assertion is made in the brief on appeal of Respondent,
Meyer, that there is any ambiguity. It is, therefore,
plain that not only are these checks not in evidence, but
by counsel's own admission there is no basis on which
they can be admitted in evidence. Notwithstanding this,
the brief makes the unfounded and wholly inconsistent
statement that :
''This court is bound to accept the proffer of
proof that for eighteen to twenty months before
his death, he (testator) maintained her with payments of at least $100.00 per month.'' (Br. p. 41.)
Obviously, no authority is cited to support this novel
proposition.
But even if the checks had been admitted in evidence,
they would not support the argument which Respondent,
Meyer, makes that the Testator had maintained her prior
to his death. The fact that the Testator gave her money
is not evidence that he maintained her. It is possible
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that the checks were given in payment of an obligation
or for some other unknown reason as to which this Court
can only speculate. The checks are not dated in monthly
sequence. Six of them are for $200.00 and one for $50.00.
The first of said checks was dated December 15, 1951,
some fourteen months prior to the execution of the will
and thirty-three months prior to the Testator's death.
It is apparent, therefore, that the checks would be meaningless even if in evidence unless the Court intended to
engage in speculation.
In asserting that the payments to Mrs. Meyer are
for her maintenance, counsel apparently has in mind
§74-3-15 U. C. A. 1953 which provides, in part, that legacies for maintenance "bear interest from a testator's
decease.'' If this is the contention, it has no merit. The
provisions of said §74-3-15 U. C. A. 1953 are controlled
by §74-3-16 which provides that "the four preceding sections are in all cases to be controlled by a testator's express intention.'' Here the Testator did not grant a
specific legacy of a certain amount of money to Respondent, Meyer, but rather devised and bequeathed the
residue of his estate to the Appellant bank as Trustee and
provided for the conditional payment to the Respondent
of certain amounts from the trust. It was expressly provided that the trust ·would not come into existence and
the title to the trust property would not Yest in the
Trustee until the final distribution of the estate from the
Executor. Any payments provided to be made from the
trust rould not, therefore, commence or accrue until then.
It is signifkant that the Testator expressly proYi<h'd for pa~,nwnts to his ·widow during probate under
20
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Paragraph SIXTH of the will. If the Testator had intended that Mrs. Meyer receive payments during the
period of probate, he would have so expressly provided
as he did in the case of his widow.
In any event, this desperate attempt by Respondents'
counsel to find another basis to support the lower court's
decree is not timely made and cannot be asserted at this
late date.
X. HOLDING IN CASE CITED BY RESPONDENT,
PIERPONT, IS CONTRARY TO PRINCIPLE FOR
WHICH CASE CITED.
At pages 11 to 12 of her brief Respondent, Pierpont,
makes the following statement :
"When resort is had to a written instrument
alone, the interpretation of the trial court, if
reasonable, will be accepted by the appellate
court, or if that interpretation is one of two
reasonable views, it will be followed.''
In support of this statement, the brief cites In re Platt's
Estate, 21 Cal. 2d 343, 131 P. 2d 825. Actually, the Respondent has cited the Platt case for a proposition which
was asserted on appeal by the respondent, but which was
rejected by the California Supreme Court. It was there
urged that since the judgment of the lower court was
"based upon a reasonable construction of the provisions
of the will concerning the right to income * * * this court
may not substitute another interpretation for it." In
rejecting this contention and in reversing the trial court,
the Supreme Court stated:
''An appellate court is not bound by a construction of the contract based solely upon the terms
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of the written instrument without the aid of evidence (citing authorities) where there is no conflict in the evidence (citing authorities) or a
determination has been made upon competent
evidence (citing authorities). Under these circumstances, there is no issue of fact and it is the
duty of an appellate court to make the final determination in accordance with the applicable
principles of law.''
We also call the Court's attention to the following
statement from In re Luckel's Estate, 151 Cal. App. 2d
481, 312 P. 2d 24, 31, cited by Respondent, Pierpont, at
pages 14 and 21 of her brief :
"The probate court's construction of the will was
based solely on its terms without the aid of evidence. Accordingly, it is the duty of this court
to construe it.''
XI. RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO CITE CONTRARY
AUTHORITIES OR TO SHOW THAT TESTATOR
INTENDED A CONTRARY RESULT CONFIRMS
APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT THAT THE PAYMENTS UNDER PARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) ARE
NOT ANNUITIES.
Because of the express will language providing that
the residual estate would vest in the Trustee and the
trust would come into being only after probate was completed and the residual estate distributed to the Trustee,
and because of the language of subparagraph SEVENTH
( i) providing for payments to the Respondents ''from
the income of the trust estate and if insufficient, from
the principal thereof", which clearly show that the subparagraph SEVENTH (i) payments were to commence
at the time of distribution to the Trustee, Respondents
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can prevail here, if at all, only if said subparagraph
SEVENTH (i) payments are annuities within the meaning of §74-3-12 U. C. A. 1953. *
Neither of Respondents cites authority nor points
to any will provisions which contradict Appellants' arguments at pages 25 to 37 of their brief to the effect
that the said subparagraph SEVENTH (i) payments
are not annuities. Respondent, Pierpont, attempts to
dispose of the subject merely by deploring Appellants'
reference to the definition of an annuity contained in
§31-11-2 U. C. A. 1953, by citing In re Sears' Estate, 18
Utah 193, 55 Pac. 83, (in which case testator's will expressly provided that payments were to commence at
his death); and by quoting fragmentary statements from
Black's Law Dictionary and Corpus Juris Secundum
which relate to the effect of an annuity, assuming that
one exists, rather than to the elements essential to the
existence of an annuity.
Respondent, Meyer's treatment of the annuity question at pages 31 to 40 of her brief is equally superficial.
She does argue, in addition, that payments "in the
nature of an annuity" are controlled by said §74-3-12,
thus evidencing the same uncertainty as the trial court
of whether these payments are, in fact, annuities. It is
clear, however, that only payments which meet the
annuity test are governed by the statute.
Although Appellants are aware of no principle of
statutory construction which limits the annuity definition
*"In case of a bequest of the interest or income of a certain sum or
fund, the income accrues from the testator's death."
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in §31-11-2 to insurance contracts, they will, in order to
forestall argument and complaint by Respondents, ignore
it and confine their analysis to the annuity definition in
§74-3-1 U. C. A., 1953 and the generally accepted annuity
definition developed in the cases set out at page 27 of
Appellants' brief. In addition to the authorities and
definitions set out there, Appellants call attention to the
following definition of an annuity contained in In re
Luckel's Estate, 151 Cal. 2d 481, 312 P. 2d 24, cited by
Respondent, Pierpont, at pages 14 and 21 of her brief:
''An annuity is a periodical payment which is
payable unconditionally, there being no contingency present.''
In this connection, we note that the California statutory
annuity definition is identical to the one in §74-3-1 U.
C. A. 1953.
The test, then, in determining if the subparagraph
SEVENTH (i) payments are annuities is whether or not
they are payable unconditionally and without contingency. The answer to this inquiry must be determined
from the language of the will viewed from the time when
the Testator executed the will and in light of the circumstances under which it was executed. Interpreted in this
manner and as of that time, there is no doubt that these
payments are not annuities. In the first place, the payments to Mrs. Pierpont are expressly conditioned upon
the continuance of her u1unarried status. In the second
plnre, the payments to both Respondents are expressly
subject to and conditioned by the provisions of subpnrngraph SEVENTH (k), under which the Trustee has
tlH' power to reduce or suspend the payments under
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certain prescribed circumstances. Said subparagraph
SEVENTH (k) also confers discretionary power upon
the Trustee to make up or not to make up suspended or
reduced payments when the reasons for the reduction
or suspension have ceased to exist. It is respectfully
submitted that under these circumstances these payments
cannot reasonably be interpreted to be annuities.
Furthermore, even if they are annuities, the payments must date from the time of distribution, not from
the date of the Testator's death, because the provisions
of ~74-3-12 are controlled by the Testator's intention as
provided in ~74-3-16. Here the Testator expressly provided that the trust estate would not vest in the Trustee
and the trust provision would not become effective until
final distribution of the estate. Under these circumstances, the subparagraph SEVENTH (i) payments
provided to be made ''from the income of the trust
estate, and, if insufficient, from the principal thereof",
logically could date only from the time the trust estate
came into existence. Also, since there was no income
from date of death until August 29, 1957 (except $244.75)
all payments between those dates must be regarded as
suspended payments under subparagraph SEVENTH
(k) and the question of whether or not such suspended
payments are to made up lies within the discretion of
the Trustee.
In connection with the last mentioned point, Respondents fail to distinguish between the effect of said
subparagraph SEVENTH (k) as it relates to : (a) the
issue of whether subparagraph SEVENTH (i) payments
are annuities and (b) the issue of whether, assuming the
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SEVENTH (i) payments are annuities, the Trustee
nevertheless has the discretion to make · up suspended
payments for the period between the date of. death and
August 29, 1957. As to the first issue, said provision
must be viewed as of the date of execution of the will.
~s to the second issue, it must be viewed as of the time
when liquid assets are available after payments have
been reduced or suspended. Of course, if said payments
are held not to be annuities and that they did not commence until distribution of theresidual estate to the
Trustee, the second issue does not exist here. The failure
of Respondents to distinguish between these essentially
different concepts has resulted in a good deal of confusion
in their briefs.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion Appellants desire to emphasize that
the fundamental issue in this case is : when did the
Testator intend that the subparagraph SEVENTH (i)
payments would commence~ This issue can be determined only from Mr. Pierpont's will. An essential element in deciding this ultimate question is the time when
the residual trust estate vested in the Trustee and the
time when the trust provisions became effective. Here
again the question can be answered only from an interpretation of the will. To support its contentions that
the will clearly provides that title to the trust property
was intended to vest only after probate was completed;
that the trust provisions were not intended to become
effective until that time and that the payments did not
commence until then, Appellants have heretofore re-
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ferred the Court and, again, respectfully refer the Court
to the three following features of the will.
FIRST, the period during which the family allowance was to be paid under paragraph SIXTH was defined by the Testator as being ''from the date of my
death until such time as my residual estate shall be distributed to my Trustee, as provided in paragraph
SEVENTH.'' The pertinent provisions of paragraph
SEVENTH which immediately follow this quotation are:
''I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate, real, personal or
mixed, wheresoever situate, whereof I may be
seized or possessed, or to which I ·may in any
manner be entitled, or in which I may be interested at the time of my death, to TRACY-COL- LINS TRUST COMPANY, of Salt Lake City,
Utah, as Trustee, in trust, nevertheless, for the
following uses and purposes :''
It is apparent from the use of the words "give, devise
and bequeath" in said paragraph SEVENTH that it is
under this paragraph that the Trustee must derive its
title to the residual estate. It is equally clear, in view
of the express language of paragraph SIXTH, that said
paragraph SEVENTH was not to become operative
until after probate had been completed, so that the distribution of the residual estate to the Trustee and the
vesting of title to the residual estate in the Trustee
would occur simultaneously.
The accuracy of this interpretation is demonstrated
by noting the illogical result that follows under paragraph SIXTH if the Lower Court's interpretation is
adopted. The Lower Court held that the provisions of
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paragraph. SEVENTH became effective and that title
to the residual estate vested in the Trustee at the Testator's death. Under this view, note that paragraph
SIXTH provides no period during which the family
allowance is to be paid, because the time of commencement (the Testator's death) is identical with the time
of termination (time of distribution as provided by
paragraph SEVENTH which the Lower Court held
occurred at death).
SECOND, in every will provision in which the Tesator granted any of his esate, except paragraph SEVENTH, the Testaor used the language ''I hereby give
and bequeath ... " In paragraph SEVENTH, however,
the word "hereby" was significantly eliminated, indicating clearly that as to all the grants except as to the
residual estate, title was to pass under the will at the
time of Testator's death.
THIRD, the numerous other will provisions referred
to and analyzed in Appellants' brief, show that Testator
clearly intended that there would be successive and not
simultaneous periods of probate and trust administration.
Since it is apparent that Testator intended that title
to the trust estate would Yest and the trust provisions
would become effectin~ at the time of distribution of the
residual estate to the Trustee, the provisions in subparagraph SEVENTH (i) that the payments were to
be made ''from the income of the trust estate and, if
insufficient, from the principal thereof'' could not logicnll)r have reference to a time prior to the time the trust
came into being.
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This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that
under paragraph SIXTH the Testator provided for a
payment to the widow of a $250.00 per month family
allowance from the date of his death to the time of
distribution, as provided in paragraph SEVENTH, and
then provided under paragraph SEVENTH for the payment to her of $250.00 per month during her lifetime or
until she remarried, subject to the conditions of subparagraph SEVENTH (k). This discloses a clear testamentary intention that the widow receive only the sum
of $250.00 per month from the date of Testator's death
subject to the applicable will provisions. The decision
of the Trial Court upsets this testamentary intention and
results in the payment to the widow of the sum of $500.00
per month during probate and $250.00 per month thereafter.

It is respectfully submitted that this interpretation
is at variance with the will and that the judgment of the
Lower Court should therefore be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
SENIOR & SENIOR
FRANCIS M. GIBBONS

Attorneys for Appellants
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